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1 It has been said that Peirce was literally talking “with the rifle rather than with the shot
gun or water hose” (Perry 1935, vol. 2: 109). Readers of his review of James’s Principles can
easily understand why. In some respects, the same might be true of the series of four
books Joseph Margolis  has been devoting to pragmatism since 2000.  One of  the first
targets of Margolis’s rereading was the very idea of a ‘revival’ of pragmatism (a ‘revival’
of something that never was, in some ways), and, with it, the idea that the long quarrel
between Rorty and Putnam was really a quarrel over pragmatism (that is was a pragmatist
revival, in some ways). The uncanny thing is that, the more one read the savory chapters
of the four books, the more one feels that the hunting season is open, but that the game is
not of the usual kind and looks more like zombies, so to speak. Not the kind of zombies
that  tramp  the  corridors  of  philosophy  of  mind  textbooks,  but  philosophical  zombies,
positions whose lifespan has been over for long but that still resurface, or, if the reader is
of more inclined towards the Classics, some philosophical equivalents of the ghosts that
Ulysses has to face in Book XI of the Odyssey and that lead whatever kind of half-life they
have by sucking the blood of the living. Starting at least with Emerson in America and
Nietzsche in Europe, the idea that the best promises of philosophy could be doomed by
the tradition, and in particular by giving too much weight to what was mislead in the
tradition, that one could be deprived of one’s own standing by too many tales about the
‘mighty dead,’ has been a matter of concern. Hence the twofold task of Margolis’s books:
what is at stake is not only the imperative of saying what would be philosophically the
best option, here and now, it is also to show that even philosophies that do not mention the
tradition in an ostensible way can still endorse options that have been dead for a long
time – unbeknownst to their proponents – and err indefinitely as a result.  One-sided
eliminative naturalism, analytic scientism were such options. These last days, the focus
has been on Brandom’s pragmatism, as participants to the 2012 Rome Conference could
attest. But this critical task should in no way hide the fact that the general purpose is of a
constructive kind, which might seem close at times to the perfectionist stance but under
strong constraints,1 and this last book makes this point tellingly.
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2 Margolis has a tantalizing formula to make this constructive dimension explicit, which
comes from Peirce, who used it in one of his reviews for The Nation.2 Since the formula
captures one of the central insights of Margolis’s last book, it might be worth looking into
it more closely.
3 Peirce’s  motto,  as  quoted by Margolis  in his  introduction is:  “Darwinizing Hegel  and
Hegelianizing Darwin.”3 This means, at the very least and to give only the most general
description, that one should not have to choose between biological naturalism and the
post-kantian emphasis on history and culture, and that, in order to account for the modes
of existence of human selves in particular, any one-sided approach is sure to fail. The
‘and’ is decisive in the motto and in the gloss that follows since it will  preclude any
comfortable  choice  between extreme biological  naturalization and a  kind of  cultural
anthropology that would be oblivious of biological evolution. This captures thus nicely
what Margolis deems to be the best and most perspicuous direction for a reconstruction
of  philosophy,  where  “the  analysis  of  biology  and  culture  must  be  seen  to  be  very
differently  conceived  but  inseparably  joined”  (5).  Margolis  sees  in  Peirce’s  motto  a
commitment that is at the core of the prophecy that he is himself spelling out in the book
and that might be pragmatism’s best promise: the commitment to “the radical thesis that
the self is a hybrid artifact of biological and cultural evolution that makes possible the
entire  run  of  the  uniquely  enlanguaged  forms  of  human  intelligence,  thought,
understanding,  reason, feeling,  experience,  activity,  conduct,  creation, and knowledge
that marks our race for what it  is” (5-6).  The revival  of  Pragmatism will  not  be the
repetition of something that already took place, it will borrow its vitality to the ‘interval
spanning Kant and Hegel’ and to the kind of naturalism that developed after Darwin’s
Origin, a major inspiration for the whole first wave of pragmatism, and it will take the
best from these two strands, at the junction of Eurocentric philosophy and American
Pragmatism. These insights are beautifully and convincingly developed in the book.
4 It  is  all  the more interesting to look at Peirce’s original review, not to find faults in
Margolis’s reading, but to compare his project and Peirce’s. If some significant differences
obtain in the process, they might give us some clues as to the actuality, and also the
novelty, of Margolis’s own stance. 
5 Peirce’s review was about the now forgotten Scottish philosopher Ritchie who, in his
book, tried to provide a Hegelian account of the principles of evolution, or, in Peirce’s
words, to “determine how far the conceptions of Hegel can advantageously be applied in
Darwinian speculation.”4 Peirce was not convinced by the result and he claimed clearly
that this dialectical reconstruction of Evolution, playing as it does with the empty notions
of Identity and Difference and their ‘interaction,’ would not do:
One  of  the  worst  faults  of  the  Hegelian  philosophy  is  that  its  conceptions  are
wanting in this definiteness, and that its consequences are not unmistakable. When
Mr.  Ritchie  undertakes  to  “Hegelianize  natural  selection”  by  the  remark  that
“Heredity and Variation are just particular forms of the categories of Identity and
Difference,  whose  union  and  interaction  produce  the  actually  existing  kinds  of
living beings,” he makes us think that Hegelianism needs to be Darwinized much
more than Darwinism needs to be Hegelianized. (Peirce, CN1, 201)
6 As we can see clearly, in Peirce, or, to be a bit more cautious, in that particular review,5
‘Darwinized  Hegelianism’  and  ‘Hegelianized  Darwinism’  are  in  no  way  on  the  same
footing. The ‘and’ that seems central in Margolis’s prophecy is not on Peirce’s agenda in
this text, since Peirce clearly opts in favor of the first option: reading Hegel – or is just
Hegelian dialectics? – through Darwinian lenses, more than the reverse. So far, so good:
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one could say that what is already a form of Hegelianized Kantianism in Peirce (if one
allows most of the argument of Chapter II on Peirce’s fallibilism) is submitted to another
new transformation, and that, as a consequence, the two dimensions – Hegelianism and
Darwinism – will be fused in the final result, so that the rest is mere quibble. Still, would
Margolis  be  content  with  only  one  part  of  the  motto  and  say  that  “Darwinized
Hegelianism” is enough? That would be my first question. 
7 But what does Peirce mean by “Darwinizing” here? I am not totally sure that this fits
perfectly in the picture Margolis gives and that it refers primarily to biological evolution
and to what we usually associate with naturalism. Peirce does not say that we should
renounce Hegel’s insights (and that might confirm in some way the reading of Peirce’s
fallibilism that Margolis gives in his Chapter II), but he does not say, neither, that one
should have a reading of Hegel based on biological evolution, or that one should endorse
a kind of naturalized hegelianism where ‘naturalized’ would refer to the living. Of course,
one could read the text in such a way that it addresses the way chance plays a part of the
stable forms of human life. Peirce has some fine lines on Darwin’s tack on the notion of
‘purpose’:  he notes that Darwin’s challenge is to assess “how teleological or purposed
action can be a secondary effect of non-teleological action,” but he does not take sides
here on this issue. The faults Peirce finds in Hegel are not related to a choice in favor of
History  and  Culture  against  Biology.  It  is  that  Hegel’s  conceptions  are  not  ‘definite’
enough, that one cannot draw experiential consequences from them. “To Darwinize” is not
equivalent, here, to ‘include into a biological narrative,’ it is used in an idiosyncratic way
– and all the question is to assess whether it is only a local phenomenon or something
that has more far-reaching implications – where this means rather, if one can stand a bit
of  anachronism:  “Popperianize.”6 Since  it  is  not  likely  that  Margolis  would  accept
“Popperianize Hegel and Hegelianize Popper” as a motto for his own book, let’s see if that
reading, if daring, is credible. 
8 The main merit of Darwin, in Peirce’s account, lies not so much in the idea of evolution
than in the scientific method he used to give an account of the origin of species. That’s
the ‘lesson of logic’ mentioned in the Illustrations. As we know, Evolution was in the air
before Darwin’s epoch-making book and Darwin does not use the word in a technical
sense in 1859, even though he gives the first scientific account of evolution. From that
standpoint, Peirce often opposes Darwin and Spencer. They might seem to have the same
theory, as regards content, but the method is drastically different:
(The  Spencerians)  cannot  understand  that  it  is  not  the  sublimity  of  Darwin’s
theories  which makes him admired by men of  science,  but  that  it  is  rather  his
minute,  systematic,  extensive,  strict,  scientific  researches  which  have  given  his
theories a more favorable reception – theories which in themselves would barely
command scientific respect. (CP: 1.33)
9 If one just sticks to the idea of biological evolution, ‘Spencerianize Hegel’ or ‘Hegelianize
Spencer’  would basically  do the same job as  the motto,  but  would of  course be less
appealing (or are they?). Peirce says more about what he has in mind a few lines later:
‘Hegelianizing’ Darwin would be in fact prefixing an empirical inquiry with a particular
metaphysics,  and “whatever could conceivably be settled by experiment,  metaphysics
should abstain from settling in advance” (Peirce, Ketner et al., 1975, vol. 1: 202). Peirce has
Comte in mind but I think it is not totally inappropriate, today, to say that the faults he
finds in Hegel involve the use of Unverifiable hypotheses and that he dismisses them in a
way that has already a Popperian twist: they are “unverifiable in the sense of leading to
no  unmistakable  consequences  capable  of  being  put  to  the  test  of  comparison  with
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observation” (ibid.). The problem with ‘Hegelianizing’ is that it leaves finally no room to
‘scientifically observed facts’ and to ‘he test of comparison with observation’: 
Hence  the  moment  a  philosopher,  upon  a-priori  or  epistemological  grounds,
enunciates any proposition whatever as true, we are warned to be upon our guard
against some jugglery. Where we have no scientifically observed facts to go upon,
the prudent thing is to confess our downright ignorance. Even where we have such
facts, we are subject to a probable error. From this pregnant fact, if one only takes
it  to  heart,  can  be  developed  a  whole  Darwinianized  Hegelism,  having  fruitful
suggestions and indications for the prosecution of science and for the conduct of
life. (Peirce, CN1, 202)
10 This brings me to my second question. Would Margolis say that Peirce’s actual motto is a
kind of slip of the pen and that what he really meant was something closer to his own
motto in the Preface? Or would he concede that this motto, as offered in his book, has a
radical novelty of its own, that it is ‘Margolisian’ first and foremost, even though it might
be rooted deeply in the authors he mentions in Pragmatism Ascendent?
11 Or, does it reveal something that would make Peirce less ‘enrollable’ in the prophecy and
thus in the reconstruction of what is still alive in Classical Pragmatism he is offering,
maybe because the stress, here, is more on the scientific method than on the kind of
naturalism we commonly  attribute  to  Darwin?  Is  the  Darwin  in  question  in  Peirce’s
review the one that Margolis wants to use in his prophecy?
12 Or, again, if what has just been said about what Peirce meant by ‘Darwinizing’ belongs in
the end to the fallibilist stance described in Chapter II of Pragmatism Ascendent, are we
getting anywhere out of Hegel? 
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NOTES
1. “Philosophy has no point (for me) if it has no convictions about the right orientation of human
life; but it has no resources of its own by which to validate any such change directly – except by
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subtraction. So it plays its part under extraordinary constraints,” Preface, p. x. The “subtractive”
part is integral part of the constructive part.
2. Review of  David G. Ritchie,  Darwin  and Hegel,  with  Other  Philosophical  Studies,  London,  Swan
Sonnenschein & Co., New York, Macmillan & Co, (1893). The review is contemporary of Peirce’s
Monist series, which includes Evolutionary Love and The Law of Mind. Retrieved in Peirce, Ketner et
al. (1975 vol. 1: 199-202).
3. This was also prominent in a Lecture entitled A Pragmatist Trajectory, delivered at the École
normale supérieure (Paris), on March, 6th, 2012, and Margolis used the motto also in “A Word of
Thanks for Peter Hare’s Patience,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 46 (1), 2010, 3-8.
4. Peirce, Ketner et al. (1975 vol. 1: 199).
5. I have not found any clear equivalent of the motto in other texts by Peirce, even though one
could embark into a close reading of the Monist series, and see in which measure they agree with
the motto, but this is a task for a book more than for the present contribution. 
6. Chauvire 1981, Haack 1977, and some others have stressed the resemblances and differences
between these philosophers. We could of course say simply ‘Peircianize,’ but it would obscure the
particular point, which relates to the way theories are put to the test.
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